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Lost ESI Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Jeffrey A. Parness*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2006, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 37(e) came into effect,
declaring that lost electronically stored information (ESI) could not prompt
"sanctions . . . on a party" absent "exceptional circumstances." Sanctions
were limited to where the loss resulted from "the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system."' Effective December 1, 2015, Rule
37(e) now contemplates limited "measures ... to cure the prejudice" caused
by lost and irreplaceable ESI arising from a party's failure "to take reasonable steps to preserve," where the lost ESI "should have been preserved in the
anticipation or conduct of litigation."2 For more culpable conduct, the new
rule contemplates possible sanctions.3
The rule was amended in 2015 because the 2006 norm had "not adequately addressed the serious problems resulting from the continued exponential growth in the volume" of ESI and because it had prompted in the
federal circuits "significantly different standards for imposing sanctions or
curative measures on parties who fail to preserve" ESI.4 The 2015 rule incorporated only some of the 2013 recommended amendments to FRCP 37(e).5
This article will first review the basic features of the old and new FRCP
37(e), as well as their place amongst other FRCP and judicial precedents on
information preservation in anticipation of and during federal civil litigation.
*

Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A. Colby
College; J.D., The University of Chicago. Thanks to Alex Yorko for his helpful
comments. All errors are mine.

1.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e) (2006) (amended 2015).

2.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e).

3.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).

4.

FED.

R. Crv. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.

5.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON

CIVIL

RULES TO STANDING COMMITTEE, REPORT ON

RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

(2013) (includes proposed revisions to

R. Civ. P. 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 37); see generally Gregory
P. Joseph, Rule 37(e): The New Law of Electronic Spoliation, 99 JUDICATURE
35 (2016); Thomas Y. Allman, The 2015 Civil Rules Package as Transmitted
to Congress, 16 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 28-45 (2015); see generally Richard
FED.

Briles Moriarty, And Now For Something Completely Different: Are the Fed-

eral Civil Discovery Rules Moving ForwardInto a New Age or Shifting Backward Into a 'Dark' Age?, 39 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 227 (2015); see
generally Philip J. Favro, The New ESI Sanctions Framework Under the Proposed Rule 37(e) Amendments, 21 RICH. J. OF LAW & TECH. 8 (2015); Charles
M. Yablon, Byte Marks: Making Sense of New F.R.C.P. 37(e), 69 FLORIDA L.
REv. (forthcoming 2017).
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It will then comment on some likely challenges posed to those utilizing or
affected by the new federal rule on lost ESI.6

H.

BASIC FEATURES OF THE 2006 FRCP 37(E)

Before 2006, lost ESI and non-ESI were comparably addressed in the
FRCP. Thus, since 1993, Rule 37(c) has stated that a party who "fails to
provide information ... is not allowed to use that information . . to supply
evidence . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless."7
Alternatively, such information could be used where the jury is informed of
the "party's failure" or where other sanctions are deemed more "appropriate."8 Additionally, since 1993, Rule 37(a)(3)(A) has stated that a party who
"fails to make a disclosure" required without "discovery request" (per Rule
26(a)) may be subject to "appropriate sanctions."9
The 2006 FRCP 37(e) on lost ESI lasted until 2015.10 As noted, the
2006 rule authorized, with a finding of "exceptional circumstances," judicial
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

Whether under the new FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) or its predecessors, ESI discovery
is often guided by party agreement, frequently per a FED. R. Civ. P. 16 scheduling order. In the absence of agreement there can be a local rule providing a
default standard for ESI discovery. See, e.g., N.D. OHIO L.R. APP. K. Seemingly, such an agreement might include different, and contractually enforceable, norms on curative measures or sanctions for lost ESI. Compare, e.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (stipulations on initial disclosures); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1)
(stipulation on discovery before FED. R. Civ. P. 26 ((f) conference)); FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(d)(3) (stipulation on sequence of discovery); and FED. R. Civ. P.
16(c) (at pretrial conference a represented party must authorize an attorney "to
make stipulations"). Any such agreements would not limit judicial initiatives
on curative measures or sanctions for lost ESI, as when there is alleged contempt of court. On the need for greater facilitation of party agreements on ESI
costs, see Genevieve H. Harte, Electronic Discovery in Civil Litigation: Avoiding Surprises in Cost Shifting Decisions, 12 SETON HALL CiR. REv. 267, 287
(2016).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(B), (C).
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(A).
While the 2006 rule operated in the federal district courts for only nine years, it
has been adopted and continues to operate in several different state courts. See,
e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 37(g); HAw. R. Civ. P. 37(f); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60237(e); MD. RULE § 2-433(b); MINN. R. Civ. § 37.05; MONT. CODE ANN. tit.
25, ch. 20, PT. V. RULE 37(f); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:23-6; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1A-1, Rule 37 (bl); TENN. R. Civ. P. 37.06; V.R.C.P. RULE 37(f). See also
UTAH R. Civ. P. 37(e) (adoption of 2006 Federal Rule 37(e) accompanied by
an explicit recognition of continuing "inherent" judicial power to deal with lost
ESI or non-ESI "in violation of a duty" to preserve), and 2013 OHIO Civ. R.
37(F) (a 2008 rule that, in addition to adding the 2006 Federal Rule 37(e), sets
out five factors that courts may consider when determining whether to sanction). But see ARIz. R. Civ. P. 37(g) (containing the 2015 Federal Rule 37(e)
FED.
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"sanctions ... on a party" who lost ESI due to "the routine, good-faith operation of "an electronic information system."11
ESI and non-ESI were, at these times, distinguished in federal procedural law norms beyond the lost information context. Thus, since the 2006 Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B) stated that "[a] party need not provide discovery of
[ESI] from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of an undue burden or cost," that party carried the burden unless the
"requesting party shows good cause."12 Since 1993,13 Federal Rule 26(f) has
stated, a now-mandatory "discovery plan" must "state . . . any issues about
disclosure, discovery, or preservation of [ESI], including the form or forms
in which it should be produced."l4 And, since 2006,15 Federal Rule
34(b)(2)(E) has stated that a party may object "to the requested form or forms
for producing" ESI. 16
Other federal discovery norms lumped together ESI and non-ESI from
2006-2015. Since 2006, the rule on required disclosures has spoken of providing a copy or description of certain "documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things" in the disclosing party's "possession,
custody, or control."17 Additionally, the rule on requests for production has
spoken of serving "any designated documents or electronically stored information ... from which information can be obtained."18 This rule comparably
situates documents and ESI for those producing discovery.19

HI.

2013 PROPOSED CHANGES TO FEDERAL RULE 37(E)

Not long after the promulgation of Federal Rule 37(e) in 2006, litigants
and potential litigants expressed concerns to the federal judicial rule makers
that "preservation problems . . . nonetheless increased."20 The chief concerns
involved "the increasing burden of preserving information for litigation, parand also articulating the parameters of the "duty to take reasonable steps to
preserve" ESI and guidelines on what constitutes such steps).
11.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e) (2006) (amended 2015).

12.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (2006) (amended 2013).

13.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 26(f) (1993) (amended 2015).

14.

Id.

15.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 34(b) (2006) (amended 2015).

16.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E).

17.

FED.

18.

FED.

19.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E).

20.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2013 amendment, at 44.

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (2006) (codified as amended at
26(a)(l)(A)(ii) (2015)).
R. Civ. P. 34(a) (codified as amended at
(2015)).

FED.

FED.

R. Civ. P.

R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A)
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ticularly with regard to electronically stored information."21 The rule makers
further observed "[s]ignificant divergences among federal courts across the
country" prompted great uncertainties for "potential parties" regarding "what
preservation standards they will have to satisfy to avoid sanctions" in later
civil actions.22
In 2013, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee responded to concerns
about information preservation issues by suggesting amendments to Rule
37(e), which would establish "a uniform set of guidelines . .. to all discoverable information, not just [ESI]" and would impose information preservation
duties "recognized by many court decisions."23 The Federal Rules no longer
tied lost ESI to an "electronic information system," as under Federal Rule
37(f) in 2006, which distinguished some lost ESI from other lost ESI and
other lost non-ESI.24
Upon breach of the new Federal Rule 37(e), the 2013 proposal envisioned ordering "additional discovery, . . . curative measures, or . .. the party
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure."25 The court could impose other sanctions or give "adverse-inference
jury instruction[s]," following a breach where either a party's actions "caused
substantial prejudice . .. and were willfu or in bad faith" or a breach "irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity" to litigate.26 The
amendment proponents suggested "factors" within the new Federal Rule
37(e) on how to assess "a party's conduct" to determine if that conduct
caused a breach of the duty to preserve information.27 In 2015, Congress
never fully adopted the 2013 proposal.28
IV.

BASIC FEATURES OF THE 2015 FEDERAL RULE 37(E)

As noted, the 2015 Federal Rule 37(e) speaks to lost ESI once found
within and outside of an "electronic information system."29 It also contemplates both curative measures and sanctions for lost and now irreplaceable
21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.; see also NMRA, 1-037 Committee Commentary for 2009 Amendments
(determining, in rejecting an adoption of Federal Rule 37(f), that its rules
should not treat different any ESI and non-ESI lost as a result of "good faith
routine destruction" of potential evidence).

24.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e).

25.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2013 amendment, at 43.

26.

Id. at 43, 48 (intending this to be a "more demanding" test than the 2006 "substantial prejudice" test).

27.

Id. at 43--44.

28.

FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee's notes to 2015 amendments.

29.

Id.
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ESI, which does not require "exceptional circumstances."30 Further analysis
of the 2015 Federal Rule 37(e) follows.
A.

Choice of Law

The new Federal Rule "forecloses reliance on inherent authority or state
law to determine when certain measures should be used" in addressing lost
ESI within a pending civil case and aims to eliminate, or at least reduce, the
"significantly different standards" within the circuits.31 Measures addressing
lost ESI depend upon the finding of a breach of the, presumably federal,
"common-law duty" regarding the preservation of "relevant information
when litigation is reasonably foreseeable" or pending.32 Such measures
should comparably apply in federal cases involving federal question and
nonfederal question claims.
While state laws on curative measures or sanctions within a federal
court case against a party who loses ESI are not to be employed, any "independent tort claim for spoliation" may be used.33 Since the federal rule explicitly covers ESI that "should have been preserved in the anticipation or
conduct of litigation,"34 it seems that one can pursue state spoliation tort
claims for ESI lost before or during federal civil litigation. These spoliation
claims thus may operate where there may be no Rule 37(e) sanction available, such as when a spoliation tort does not require-as does a Rule 37(e)
sanction-a failure "to take reasonable steps to preserve."35 For example,
consider lost ESI prompting strict liability under a state information preservation statute. 36
30.

.31.

Id. These differences are not always recognized or deemed significant. See,
e.g., Gonzalez-Bermudez v. Abbott Labs. PR Inc., No. CV 14-1620(PG), 2016'
WL 5940199, at *23 n.10 (D.P.R. Oct. 9, 2016) (stating the new Federal Rule
37(e) has "substantially similar" considerations on imposition of sanctions as
did former rule).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's notes to 2015 amendments.

32.

Id.; see, e.g., Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir.
2001) (applying federal, not New York, spoliation principles during a discovery dispute in a product liability case arising from a New York accident); Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Plattform Advert., Inc., No. 14-CV-02464-JWL-TJJ, 2016
WL 492743 (D. Kan. Feb. 8, 2016) (going so far, and too far, to say a prelawsuit duty to preserve arises "any time a party receives notification that litigation is likely to commence" in the case of cease and desist letter which was
acknowledged and acted upon within a few days).

33.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.

34.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e).

35.

Id.

36.

See, e.g., 210 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1 (West 2016) (hospital duty to keep
certain X-rays); Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Decatur, 597 N.E.2d 616, 620
(Ill. 1992) (implied cause of action arises from statute, to be governed by prin-
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Irreplaceable Lost ESI

The new federal rule only addresses curative measures or sanctions for
lost ESI that "cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery."37
Presumably, other rules will guide judicial responses to lost ESI that is restorable or replaceable.38 Here, rules guiding lost ESI and non-ESI discovery
will apply comparably. These rules likely will authorize measures or sanctions against the party losing replaceable information, such as an assessment
of any expenses related to ESI resurrection.39

C.

Culpability

The 2006 version of Rule 37(e) exempted sanctions for ESI lost via
"good faith" conduct in the "operation of an electronic information system."40 The 2015 version allows curative measures for lost ESI arising from
failures "to take reasonable steps to preserve."41 Non-systemic failures to
preserve ESI, such as text messages, are now covered.42
ciples of negligence (per se) or strict liability). Cf Howard Reg'l Health Sys. v.
Gordon, 952 N.E.2d 182, 187-88 (Ind. 2011) (no implied cause of action arising from violation of the statute on maintenance of health care records).
37.

R. Civ. P. 37(e).
38. Outside the Article III Federal courts, lost and replaceable ESI, lost and irreplaceable ESI, and lost non-ESI typically prompt the same judicial sanction
guidelines. See, e.g., ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIv. § 5.01 (2017 rev.
ed.) (allowable adverse inference instruction for failure to offer evidence within
a party's power to produce). So, between jurisdictions there can be different
jury instruction guidelines. Cf Domanus v. Lewicki, 742 F. Supp. 3d 290, 296,
299 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (on lost ESI, there could be a "spoliation charge" to the
jury (also known as a "permissible inference instruction") or "an adverse inference charge" to the jury, where only the latter directs the jury to presume the
missing evidence would have been adverse to the spoliating party).
39. See, e.g., CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 488, 497-98
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (even though Rule 37(e) is not applicable, inherent authority
can be used to sanction parties for lost ESI). On discovery cost allocations in
the federal district courts, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Rationalizing Cost Allocation in Civil Discovery, 34 REv. LITIG. 769, 812 (2015) (urging rejection of the
nascent argument that the producer-pays rule should be abandoned in favor of a
requester-pays rule).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) (2006) (amended 2015).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
42. See Living Color Enterprises, Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd., No. 14-CV62216, 2016 WL 1105297, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016) (text messages constitute ESI); Nuvasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med., Inc., No. 13-CV-2077
BTM(RBB), 2016 WL 305096, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) (no adverse
inference instruction against company on lost employee text messages for its
failure to take adequate steps to make sure its employees compiled complied
with litigation hold; but, jury can hear about lost ESI); Flagg v. Staples the
FED.

2017]

Lost ESI Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

31

Further, unlike in 2006, judicial measures addressing lost ESI no longer
are only available under "exceptional circumstances."4 3 Yet, a curative measure under current Rule 37(e) for negligently lost ESI always requires
"prejudice to another party."44
Available judicial responses are broader when conduct prompting lost
ESI is caused by a party's actions intending "to deprive another party of the
information's use in the litigation."45 The Rule 37(e) requisites for "intent to
deprive" remain unclear,46 however, as with the possible imputations of intent due to reckless conduct (though "grossly negligent loss" of ESI is clearly
outside the definition of intent).47 When there is an intent to deprive, there is
no "requirement that the court find prejudice to the party deprived of the
information."48 "[T]he finding of intent ... can support ... an inference that
the opposing party was prejudiced by the loss of information that would have
favored its position."49
D.

Burden of Proof

Seemingly, the burden of proof for the failure to preserve lost, irreplaceable ESI is on the party seeking a Rule 37(e) measure or sanction. This
should encompass burdens as to the "possession, custody or control" of the:
ESI,50 as well as to the breach of the aforementioned "common-law duty"
Office Superstore E., Inc., No. 1:14CV0004, 2015 WL 5730704, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 29, 2015) (individual plaintiff suffered adverse inference instruction
when she negligently failed to preserve text messages when trading in old
phone for new phone).
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

50.

Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e), with

2015).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(f) (2006) (amended

See CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 488, 499, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); Best Payphones, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 1-CV-3924,
2016 WL 792396, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2016) (discussing how intent to
deprive differs regarding lost "tangible evidence" and lost ESI).
On distinguishing between negligent and reckless acts causing lost ESI, see, for
example, Pegasus Aviation I, Inc. v. Varig Logistica, 46 N.E. 3d 601, 605-06
(N.Y. 2015).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. On ways
to approach "intentional" acts in other settings, see, for example, Bullock v.
BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1755 (2013) (describing "defalcation"
in Bankruptcy Code settings).
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) (request "to produce" or "inspect, copy, test,
or sample"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C) (production or inspection
request accompanying "a subpoena commanding attendance at a deposition,
hearing, or trial"). Thorny questions have emerged regarding who has "posses-

SMU Science and Technology Law Review

32

[Vol. XX

regarding information preservation. However, Rule 37(e) "does not place a
burden of proving or disproving prejudice on one party or another," leaving
"judges with discretion to determine how to best assess prejudice in particular cases."51 Thus, where "the content of the lost information may be fairly
evident," placement of the burden on the party seeking judicial responses to
lost and irreplaceable ESI to prove prejudice "may be reasonable."52 When
determining the content of lost information is difficult, it may be unfair to
place the burden on the party seeking judicial action, as the losing party has
far more information on the lost ESI than the seeking party.
E.

Curative Measures and Sanctions

Judicial responses to lost and irreplaceable ESI under the 2015 rule include curative measures for unintentional acts and sanctions for more culpable acts. Generally, upon a finding of prejudice arising from unintentional
loss of irreplaceable ESI, per the current Rule 37(e), a court can impose measures "no greater than necessary to cure."53 A broad range of measures are
"entrusted to the court's discretion,"54 including foreclosing certain evidence
and allowing evidence and argument to the jury regarding the lost ESI.55
When a party loses ESI by acting "with the intent to deprive another
party of the information's use in litigation,"56 per current FRCP 37(e), a sanctioning court can-though it need not-presume the lost ESI "was unfavorable to the party;" instruct the jury that it "may or must presume" such
disfavor,57 dismiss the case, or enter a default judgment58 The sanctioning
sion, custody or control," leading to inconsistent federal circuit precedents. See,
e.g., The Sedona Conference Commentary on Rule 34 and Rule 45 "Possession, Custody or Control", 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 467, 482-83 (2016).
51.

FED.

52.

Id.

53.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1).

54.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.

55.

Id.; see, e.g., Matthew Enter., Inc. v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 2016 WL 2957133, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016) (allowing evidence and argument regarding lost
ESI); Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet Corp., No. 4:15-CV-0070-HLM,
2016 WL 5339601, at *11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016).

56.

FED.

57.

See, e.g., 0' Berry v. Turner, No. 7:15-CV-00064-HL, 2016 WL 1700403, at
*4 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2016) (mandated presumption for "irresponsible and
shiftless behavior"); Brown Jordan International, Inc. v. Carmicle, 2016 WL
815827, at *37 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2016) ("bad faith" leads to "adverse
inference").

58.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.

R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).

&

R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2)(A)-(C); see, e.g., Chin v. Port Authority of N.Y.
N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2012); Internmatch, Inc. v. Nxtbigthing,
LLC, 2016 WL 491483, at 12-13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2016) (default judgment
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court may leave the issue of intent to the jury.59 Without intent, while there
can be no jury instruction mandating or permitting a jury "to infer from the
loss of information that it was, in fact, unfavorable to the party that lost it,"60
there can be evidence on the loss and on the likely relevance of the lost ESI.61
F.

Party

As noted, since 2006, FRCP 37(e) has addressed curative measures
against "a party" for lost ESI as a result of a failure to take reasonable steps
to preserve. 62 When a party is an entity like a corporation or a governmental
office, a question arises of whose acts within the entity can prompt entity
responsibility for lost ESI. To date, some courts have employed an unsatisfactory test focusing on the "key" players in private entity settings.63 But
here, culpability for key player conduct sometimes includes findings not only
on the players' bad acts but also on the entity's independent failure to monitor those bad acts.64 Vicarious entity liability alone may not suffice everywhere. Cautious lawyers and judges should explore acts beyond a particular
agent's conduct to assess whether the entity itself can be deemed to have

culpability.

The use of agency principles to assign culpability should not always be
comparably applied to private and public entities. In at least some instances,
those who run or oversee certain aspects of private entities have more control
over entity employees who store ESI than do public entity employees. Public
standards). State cases grappling with the choice of an appropriate response to
lost ESI include Arbor Realty Funding, LLC v. Herrick, Feinstein LLP, 36
N.Y.S.3d 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1 2016) (non-willful loss) and Pegasus Aviation I,
Inc. v. Varig Logistica S.A., 26 N.Y.S.3d 543 (N.Y. 2015) (distinguishing willful and non-willful losses while focusing on relevance of lost ESI to claims
presented).
R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment, at 20.

59.

FED.

60.

Id. at 19.

61.

Id. On molding curative FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) measures, see CAT3, LLC v.
Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 488, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Marshall v.
Dentfirst, P.C., 313 F.R.D. 691, 695 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (discretion on lost ESI
sanctions "substantially similar" before and after new FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)).

62.

FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (2006) (amended 2015);

63.

See, e.g., In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(with a duty to preserve, entity needs to notify, and then remind, "key players"
within entity and those key persons outside the entity over whom the entity has
"control," about the need to preserve); Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 494, 512 (D. Md. 2009); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Product Liability Litig., 299 F.R.D. 502, 513-14 (S.D. W. Va. 2014).

64.

See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 434 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (party must monitor its employees' preservation efforts to ensure its employees were compliant).

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e).

34
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entities, unlike private entities, often have less-or perhaps no-choice on
how their information is stored electronically. At times, separate public entities may be statutorily vested with record development and recordkeeping in
order to facilitate general public access rights that are only applicable to public entities.
When a party is an individual in federal civil litigation, whose acts can
prompt the responsibility of that individual for lost ESI?65 If an individual
party is an employer, it seems more fair to hold the employer accountable for
an employee's loss of ESI than to hold a non-employer responsible for another's loss of ESI, such as when a spouse or child deletes information on an
account holder's phone or computer. Employees are often more susceptible
to individual employer oversight than one family member over another.66
Thus, even if agency is found between two parties, an entity or an individual party may not always be strictly liable for the ESI lost by the agent.
Liability may depend on whether the party also can be shown to have acted
unreasonably regarding the preservation of ESI, such as through negligent
hiring, training, or supervision of an employee responsible for information
preservation. In at least one case, a court determined that an entity was responsible for the intentionally malicious acts of agents who only acted in
order to aid the entity.67 Generally, employers are vicariously responsible for
some, but not all, acts of their employees. Thus there are differences between
actions such as bad driving (where the principal is liable) and discrimination
during the course of employment (where the principal is not always liable).68
65.

See, e.g., Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 592 (4th Cir. 2001)
(claimant's lawyer is not responsible for lost non-ESI information as claimant
personally failed to notify potential defendant though he clearly anticipated future litigation).

66.

But an employee deleting an individual employer's work-related information
from her private email account is often less susceptible to oversight than is a
minor child who deletes family-related information from an email account set
up and paid for by her parent(s).

67.

GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., No. CV 12-1318-LPS, 2016 WL
3792833, at *8 (D. Del. July 12, 2016) (company responsible for rogue employee who failed to adhere to company's preservation directives, as his bad
faith was undertaken to protect the company, not himself; yet others in the
company also acted badly after learning of the rogue employee's acts, including conduct involving "repeated obfuscation and misrepresentations" relating
to the lost ESI and the company's "investigation" of it).

68.

See, e.g., Boston v. U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 467 (7th Cir. 2016) (employer liability for employee acts under Title VII and ADEA); but cf Doe v.
Sanchez, 52 N.E.3d 618 (Ill. App. 2d 2016) (private employer liable for employee's sexual assault though outside scope of employment as a bus service
owes its passengers a nondelegable duty of care). See generally Mark C.
Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability DiscriminationLaw, 56
B.C.L. REv. 1417 (2015).
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The issues would be easier if a party's agent was similarly analyzed in
all civil procedure settings. But such uniformity does not exist. Consider a
law firm's agent faced with one of several civil procedure contexts. For sanctions arising from frivolous pleadings or motions, FRCP 11 expressly recognizes a law firm's responsibility for its lawyer's violations.69 Yet for
sanctions arising from statutory breaches involving vexatious multiplication
of proceedings, for now in at least in some federal circuits, law firms are not
vicariously liable.70 Consider, as well, a party's "representative" in the work
product context, who by rule includes the "party's attorney, consultant,
surely, indemnitor, insurer or agent."71
State civil procedure laws sometimes apply in the federal courts. Here,
there are also differing approaches to agency. For example, under Illinois
law, a party's agent differs in attorney-client communication and ex parte
communication settings. Only in the attorney-client privileged communication setting is a corporation's agent defined by the control group test.7 2 While
Illinois attorney-client communication norms control in federal courts 7 3 hearing diversity or supplemental jurisdiction claims, they will not apply when
federal question claims are litigated. Then, for example, the federal norm
rejecting the control group test will control.74
Nonparty entities or individuals can fail to preserve ESI with acts that
cannot be attributed to parties who are entities or individuals.75 Such a non,
69.

70.

R. Civ. P. 11(c) (though the firm may only be liable, or more likely be
liable when the firm failed to act to correct the frivolous presentations, especially during the 21-day safe harbor period when it was more likely on notice
of the allegations of frivolity).
See, e.g., Castellanos Group Law Firm, L.L.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 545
B.R. 401 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016) (reviewing split in Circuits on application of 28
U.S.C. 1927).
FED.

R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3)(A).

71.

FED.

72.

Cf Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie, 432 N.E.2d 250 (111. 1982) (control group test operates in attorney-corporate client communication setting),
with ILL. SUP. CT. R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (in ex parte communication setting, a represented corporation includes a "constituent" (but not a "former constituent") of
the corporation "whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be
imputed" to the corporation "for the purposes of civil or criminal liability").
See also IL. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D) (out of court statement can be offered into
evidence against a corporation as an "admission" if it is a statement by the
corporation's "agent or servant concerning a matter with the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship").

73.
74.
75.

FED. R. EvID. 501. See generally The Manitowoc Co., Inc. v. Kachmer, No. 14-

CV-9271, 2016 WL 2644857 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2016).
Upjohn v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
See generally In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2007),
affd sub nom. Gordon Partners v. Blumenthal, No. 02 CIV 7377, 2007 WL
1518632 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2007).
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party entity includes, e.g., a defending party's insurance company that has
taken control of the defense under an insurance contract. Such a nonparty
individual includes, e.g., a complaining party's attorney who has been delegated the control of a claim presentation under a retainer agreement. Nonparty ESI preservation failures can prompt independent spoliation claims,
usually in tort, by their insureds' or clients' adversaries.76 Yet such claims are
difficult since claimants must prove that, but for the lost ESI, they would
have prevailed on the merits of any claim related to the lost ESI.77 But when
such claims are unavailable, as when would-be claimants would or do prevail, the failures nevertheless hinder the civil litigation processes. Should
such nonparties be subject to Rule 37(e) sanctions, as there are no other apparent curative measurers, for lost and irreparable ESI? If not under the rule
itself, might such sanctions be employed per inherent judicial powers?
At times, written civil procedure laws explicitly address sanctions
against nonparties for their acts negatively impacting civil litigation. For example, FRCP 1 1(c)(1) authorizes sanctions for frivolous pleadings to be assessed against "any" attorney or law firm "that violated the rule or is
responsible for the violation," with law firm vicarious responsibility for violations "by its partner, associate or employee" in the absence of "exceptional
circumstances.7 8 And, per FRCP 37(b)(2)(A), certain discovery violations
can prompt sanctions on a nonparty, including certain witnesses.79 Finally,
sanctions may be imposed by statute on jurors for certain civil litigation misconduct.8 0 The absence of any explicit recognition of sanctioning authority
involving lost or irreplaceable ESI by a nonparty per FRCP 37(e) is troublesome, though curable via inherent powers.
G.

Spoliation Torts

Once a federal civil action has been commenced, lawyers (and often
their party clients, and at times others, like witnesses) generally must preserve evidence relevant to the pending claims. Under ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(d), lawyers may not themselves "engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice" and must not assist or
induce others to engage in such conduct.81 More specifically, Model Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(a) demands that a lawyer not act in ways that "un76.

Id. at 195.

77.

Id. at 192.

78.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).

79.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).

80.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(B). See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (failure by summoned
juror to appear can result in a fine of no more than one thousand dollars, imprisonment for no more than three days, and/or an order to perform community
service).

81.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr r.

8.4(d) (2016).
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lawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value."82 These and other83 model attorney conduct rules applicable to information preservation typically are employed in the federal courts,84 as are special state attorney conduct rules governing ESI.s5
Both post-lawsuit and pre-lawsuit, there are also responsibilities for
non-lawyers that are somewhat different, though they can also apply to some
lawyer conduct. The Illinois Supreme Court said this about evidence preservation in 1995 under general tort law in Boyd v. Travelers Insurance
Company:
The general rule is that there is no duty to preserve evidence; however, a duty to preserve evidence may arise through an agreement,
contract, a statute . . . or . . . special circumstance. Moreover, a
defendant may voluntarily assume a duty by affirmative conduct... In any of the foregoing instances, a defendant owes a duty
of due care to preserve evidence if a reasonable person in the defendant's position should have foreseen that the evidence was material to a potential civil action.86
Elsewhere there are different general tort laws, as well as special tort
law principles, on information preservation by non-lawyers relating to future
and pending civil litigation. For example, spoliation needs to be intentional in
some jurisdictions for a tort claim to arise,87 while elsewhere there is no

3.4(a) (2016).

82.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr r.

83.

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr r. 3.2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) (a
lawyer "shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation"); MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUcT r. 3.3(b) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) (a lawyer in an adjudica-

tive proceeding who knows a person has engaged in fraudulent conduct "shall
take reasonable remedial steps").
84.

The ABA Model Rules have been widely adopted by the states and thus generally regulate licensed lawyers wherever they practice, including within federal
courts. Some local federal courts expressly look to the state professional conduct laws for lawyers in their states. See, e.g., 1 ITH CIR. r. I add. 8 and 4TH
CR. r. 46(g).

85.

See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT r. 4.4 (b) (lawyer receiving inadver-

86.

Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ill. 1995), as modified on
denial of reh'g.

87.

See O'Neal v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, No. CIV. 11-4182-KES, 2012 WL
3834842, at *3 (D.S.D. Sept. 4, 2012) (listing seven state high courts recogniz-

tently sent ESI shall promptly notify the sender).

ing "intentional spoliation of evidence as an independent, cognizable tort
claim").
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independent tort for spoliation of evidence by a non-party. 88 A state law recognizing an "independent tort claim for spoliation" has been deemed by the
2015 FRCP 37(e) judicial rule makers to be applicable to lost ESI (and likely
other information) during (or relevant to) federal lawsuits.89
There are also special state evidence preservation statutes and court
rules that could be employed in federal cases. In the pre-lawsuit setting, an
illustrative Illinois statute requires that hospitals generally retain an x-ray for
at least five years, and for up to twelve years if notified within five years that
there is pending litigation in which the x-ray is "possible evidence."90 In the
post-lawsuit setting, an exemplary special court rule is the Illinois Supreme
Court Rule which requires parties receiving inadvertently produced privileged or opinion work product materials to sequester (if not return or destroy)
the documents. 9 1 Employment of special state preservation laws will not be
utilized in federal courts, however, if their use would "significantly interfere
with federal control of discovery."92
Outside statutory, rule, contract, and voluntary act settings, third persons-those who are not prospective or actual parties in litigation, or their
lawyers-as well as potential litigants can have common law pre-lawsuit evidence preservation duties per the Boyd case, and comparable state law precedents, under a "special circumstance" analysis. Insurers of alleged tortfeasors
who become aware of likely claims by third parties against their insureds
generally have no evidence preservation duties93 unless they assumed control
over the evidence.94 Perhaps even lawyers who become aware of likely
claims against their clients and who assume control over evidence have evidence preservation duties to non-clients.95
88.

See Ortega v. City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189, 1197 (N.Y. 2007) (no
independent tort claim for evidence spoliation against nonparty); Temple Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 228 (Cal. 1999) ("no tort remedy should be available" for "intentional spoliation of evidence by third
parties"); but see id. at n.3 (not deciding whether there ever may be a claim for
negligent spoliation of evidence).

89.

FED.

90.

210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1.

91.

ILL. SUP. CT.

92.

See Passmore v. Baylor Health Care System, 823 F. 3d 292, 298 (5th Cir.
2016) (detailing a Texas statute (on negative effects of a failure to serve an
expert report within 120 days) does not apply in a federal court).

93.

Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ill. 2004).

94.

Jones v. O'Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98, 107 (111. App.
Ct. 2007).

95.

See, e.g., ILL. SuP. CT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 ("competence"

R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment, at 2.
R. 201(p).

means "a lawyer should keep abreast of ...
with relevant technology").

the benefits and risks associated
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Where there are evidence preservation duties, breaches may be addressed in at least two different ways by federal courts. There can be curative
measures or sanctions under FRCP 37(e) and other federal rules, and there
can be independent spoliation claims.96 Against nonparties (or third parties),
there will only be spoliation claims if nonparties are generally not subject to
judicial measures or sanctions for conduct unrelated to formal discovery, as
suggested earlier. Spoliation claims often will be heard "concurrently with
the underlying suit on which it is based,"97 assuming valid jurisdiction. Spoliation claimants must typically show how, with the evidence that was lost or
destroyed, the claimants had a reasonable probability of succeeding on their
underlying cases. 98
Jurisdictional issues over state spoliation claims loom within the new
Rule 37(e). The rule is intended not to "affect the validity of an independent
tort claim for spoliation if state law applies in a case and authorizes the
claim."99 Does this mean that state spoliation claims are only available where
the federal court has a related diversity of citizenship or supplemental jurisdiction state law claim before it? Or does it mean that one can pursue state
spoliation claims in a federal district court even when the pending dispute
96.

See, e.g., Wofford v. Tracy, 48 N.E.3d 1109, 1119 (Ill. App. 2d 2015), appeal
denied, 48 N.E.3d 678 (Ill. 2016) (noting different levels of culpability for procedural curative measures or sanctions and for substantive spoliation claims).
The choice between the tort and nontort approaches has been called "two roads
diverged in a wood." Adams v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., 830 N.E. 2d 645,
652 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).

97.

Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1995) (detailing product
liability and negligence claims against manufacturer of a heater and a spoliation claim against claimant's employee's insurer for loss of heater); Schaefer v.
Universal Scaffolding & Equip., LLC, 839 F. 3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2016) (detailing workers' compensation and spoliation claims against worker's employer). At times, res judicata principles require spoliation claimants to present
their spoliation claims in the underlying suits, at least against the defendants.
See, e.g., Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 756 N.E. 2d 657, 660 (Ohio 2001)
(explaining that a spoliation claim may be presented against an earlier defendant in a second suit only where the evidence on spoliation was not discovered
during the underlying suit); Stillwagon v. City of Delaware, 175 F. Supp. 3d
874, 912-13 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (showing that even when spoliation was discovered during underlying suit, a spoliation is not barred by res judicata where that
claim could not have been joined in the underlying suit, like when the previous
suit was a criminal action). Concurrent hearings on spoliation claims and the
relevant underlying suits will certainly be far less likely when the claims are
presented by parties against their own current or even one-time lawyers where
lawyer evidence spoliation can, at times, be characterized as malpractice. See,
e.g., Galenek v. Wismar, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999);
Myers v. Robert Lewis Seigle, P.C., 751 A. 2d 1182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).

98.

Hartmann Realtors v. Biffar, 13 N.E.3d 350, 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).

99.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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H.

Impact on State Court Litigation

,

involves only a related federal law claim? With the former approach, there
are already pending substantive nonfederal claims. The latter approach allows a state substantive law claim involving pre-suit investigation and lost
ESI where the federal civil action was grounded on only a federal substantive
law claim.100 If the latter approach is followed, seemingly federal judicial
powers regarding discretionary subject matter jurisdiction are still available
under ancillary jurisdiction precedentsol or the supplemental jurisdiction
statute,1 02 so that certain related state spoliation claims can be left nevertheless to the state courts.

Obviously, FRCP Rule 37(e) impacts lawyers practicing exclusively in
federal courts. But it will also impact lawyers who practice in state courts, as
well as lawyers who do not litigate in court at all.
For all lawyers, wherever they may practice, the new Rule 37(e) will
surely influence information gathering and preservation if the federal standard is adopted for state court civil actions. While the 2006 version of Rule
37(e) was not widely adopted by state civil procedure lawmakers,103 other
recent FRCP innovations-like proportionality in discovery-have been
more widely implemented.104
Many state civil procedure laws to date, unlike FRCP 37(e), have consistently lumped together ESI and non-ESI in discovery and spoliation tort
settings. Separate federal ESI norms in 2015 were founded on not only "the
continued exponential growth" in "the volume" of ESI, but also the "significantly different" federal court precedents on possible sanctions and curative
measures for lost ESI which "have caused litigants to expend excessive effort
and money on preservation in order to avoid the risk of severe sanctions if a
court finds they did not do enough."105 For state civil procedure lawmakers to
propound new special written laws on lost ESI, they may need to be shown
troubling interstate variations that have prompted excessive efforts in information preservation. There may also be an exploration by state lawmakers
100. Perhaps the former approach is unavailable to a federal district court under the
Rules Enabling Act since an inability to pursue a related state spoliation claim
in a federal court, federal claim case does not really just regulate federal court
procedure as it effectively abridges a state substantive right to sue. See, e.g.,
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
407-08 (2010).
101. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80
(1994) (showing that one purpose of ancillary jurisdiction is to "enable a court
to function successfully").
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012).
103. But see supra note 10.
104. Compare, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(c)(3), with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).

105.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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into whether significant problems with lost information relevant to civil litigation are limited to ESI or have also arisen in non-ESI settings-curiously
an inquiry not addressed in the legislative history of the new FRCP 37(e).106
Assuming no new written state civil procedure laws on lost ESI, many
state court lawyers will nevertheless need to consider the new federal ESI
preservation rule. That rule governs lost information that should have been
preserved "in the anticipation [of]" as well as in the "conduct of litigation[J"107 Many pre-lawsuit inquiries are undertaken by state court lawyers
without precise knowledge of where future litigation will occur.
Even where only future federal litigation is clearly foreseen, possible
information preservation duties under state tort laws remain.108 The federal
procedural "common-law duty" to "preserve relevant information when litigation is reasonably foreseeable," utilized in FRCP 37(e) proceedings, "does
not affect the validity of an independent tort claim for spoliation if state law
applies in a case and authorizes the claim."09 Federal practitioners will likely
attempt to have state spoliation tort law applied to lost ESI and non-ESI
information in their federal cases. Where supplemental or ancillary jurisdiction is denied, 1o there may be two factually related cases proceeding simultaneously, with one in federal court and one in state court.
In crafting the 2015 FRCP 37(e), the federal rule makers explicitly recognized there could be "an independent obligation to preserve information"
that would not meet the federal procedural common law preservation duty
applicable to discovery disputes under FRCP 37(e).III This independent obligation could extend beyond spoliation torts, prompting simultaneous state
and federal court proceedings.I12 For example, in some states, beyond settings involving perpetuating testimony via pre-suit depositions, as also allowed by FRCP 27, there are procedural laws or precedents recognizing
"independent" actions and equitable bills seeking to preserve information.113
106. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (showing that special protections from ESI
discovery held by sources "not reasonably accessible" to a party "because of
undue burden or cost").
107.
108.

109.
110.

111.

R. Civ. P. 37(e).
See ILL. SuP. CT. R. 201(p); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272
(Ill. 1995).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2015) (explaining that supplemental jurisdiction is
discretionary); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380
(1994) (explaining that a court needs ancillary jurisdiction to function
successfully).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
FED.

112. See id.
113. See FED. R. Civ. P. 27; see, e.g., ILL. SuP. CT. R. 214 (explaining that a plaintiff may designate as "respondent in discovery" one who is not a named defendant and who is believed to have information on who should be named as
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Such initiatives on information gathering and preservation might be able to
be pursued in state courts for materials, including both ESI and non-ESI,
needed in anticipated or ongoing federal court actions.114

V.

CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE 2015 FRCP 37(E)

FRCP 37(e) now presents difficult challenges to Article 1H federal court
judges and to the lawyers in and out of their courts."i 5 Challenges include
issues relating to both the structure and the wording of the rule.116 The 2013
proposed amendments to this rule, with their Advisory Committee Notes,.
present little aid to those confronting these challenges, as do the 2015 Advisory Committee Notes.117
Structurally, challenges are presented by the rule's differentiation between lost ESI and non-ESI, a difference not contemplated within the 2013
proposal.] i8 There appears little reasoned justification or explanation to date
for treating differently one who purposely erases electronic texts and one
who purposely shreds documents.119 Further, Rule 37(e) now differentiates
between replaceable and irreplaceable lost ESI, leaving other rule provisions
to address possible curative measures and/or sanctions for replaceable lost
ESI, thereby lumping together lost ESI and lost non-ESI for at least some
purposes.1 20
defendant); Walton v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 818 N.E.2d 1242, 1243 (Ill. App. Ct.
2d 2004) (showing an example where no independent equitable bill of discovery available to a party in a related worker's compensation case where ifi that
case such discovery was not recognized); Guertin v. Guertin, 561 N.E.2d 1339,
1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d 1990) (recognizing precedents allowing presuit discovery
proceedings in "unusual" settings). See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 202.1(b) (showing
a petition for an order authorizing a deposition "to investigate a potential claim
or suit").
114. One obstacle to at least some such related state court initiatives might be lack
of justiciability, as there is no foreseeable or pending state court lawsuit on the
merits of any claim. Yet federal and state courts do facilitate depositions related to civil actions foreseeable or pending elsewhere.
115.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e); see generally Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski,

InstitutionalCompetence and Civil Rules Interpretation, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
64 (2016) (helping interpret the FED. R. Civ. P.).

116. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment; FED. R.
Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note to 2013 amendment.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).

119. See, e.g., Best Payphones v. New York, No. 1-CV-3924, 2016 WL 792396, at
*3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2016) (explaining that when both ESI and documents are
lost by the same party, some courts will-for now-apply two different sanction norms).
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
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As to the wording of Rule 37(e), significant uncertainties loom regarding the interplay between the federal common law duty to preserve ESI for
federal discovery purposes and state spoliation torts for lost ESI, which
clearly still operate for lawyer, party, witness, and third party conduct both in
anticipation of and during federal litigation.121
Further, there are not only the challenging choice of law issues noted
earlier, but also challenges arising when a party's agents are differently defined under the federal common law information preservation duty and the
applicable state spoliation law.122 While the new Rule 37(e) is based on the
existing common law duty of "potential" (and actual) litigants to preserve
relevant information when litigation is "reasonably foreseeable" (or pending?), this duty may vary in tort, as in the Boyd case in Illinois, where the
high court deemed that general tort law principles guided spoliation but then
established some special guidelines.123
The difference between replaceable and irreplaceable ESI remains unclear. Is ESI irreplaceable if the cost of replacement is very high, perhaps
measured by a proportionality test as is employed in other federal discovery
settings?24 The new rule is also unclear on the relevance of reckless condu t
in assessing intent to deprive, as well as the burden of proof on prejudice
arising from lost irreplaceable ESI.125
Further, FRCP 37(e) now contemplates some real difference between
the presumed unfavorability of lost irreplaceable ESI when there is intent to
deprive and the need for evidence on the likely favoritism of lost irreplaceable ESI when no such intent exists.126 Yet, it is uncertain how differently
juries will approach presumptive and non-presumptive disfavor.
As to who is a "party" subject to curative measures or sanctions due to
lost irreplaceable ESI, FRCP 37(e) again is vague.1 27 In "party" settings for
other procedural norms applicable to entities, like privilege and ex parte contacts, a "party" is differently defined.128 And even for individuals, their
agents for whom they are responsible can vary, as in negligent driving and
121. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 115.
122. Jeffrey A. Parness, Lost ESI: The New FRCP 37(e) and All Illinois Lawyers,
KANE CTY. ILL. BAR BRIEFS 43, 44-45 (2016).
123.

R. Civ. P. 37(e); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill.
1995).

FED.

124. United States v. Univ. of Neb. at Kearney, No. 4:11CV3209, 2014 WL
4215381, at *3 (D. Neb. 2014); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Brudnicki, 291
F.R.D. 669, 676-77 (N.D. Fla. 2013).
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).

126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Parness, supra note 122, at 44.
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sexual harassment settings.129 How should agents be defined under the new
rule?
Finally, FRCP 37(e) presents challenges regarding the interplay of its
norms and the very different state civil practice norms that can operate presuit for ESI that will be germane to later foreseeable federal or state court
civil litigation.130 Clearly state spoliation tort norms will operate in at least
some later federal cases. 131 Yet, might state civil discovery, professional responsibility, and special statutory preservation duties be used in assessing
culpability for lost irreplaceable ESI under Rule 37(e), especially when state
law claims are in dispute and when these preservation duties may be deemed
substantive for Erie doctrine purposes?32
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the last decade, FRCP 37(e) has been altered twice to deal specially
with lost ESI due to "the continued exponential growth in the volume" of

ESI.133 To date, many state civil procedure laws have not followed as they

continue to lump together lost ESI and non-ESI in discovery settings.134 Further, while state spoliation tort laws, recognized in Rule 37(e), have expanded, they too comparably address lost ESI and non-ESI.135
The impact of the current FRCP 37(e) on civil litigation practices generally remains unclear. But what is clear is that the federal district courts will
struggle for some time with issues under the new rule in such areas as choice
of law, necessary culpability, burden of proof, agency, and the role of state
spoliation torts and other state information preservation duties in federal
litigation.

129. See id.; see, e.g., Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir.
2001).

130. See

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(e).

131. See Parness, supra note 122, at 46.
132. Consider the ongoing disagreement in the federal courts over the applicability
of special state medical malpractice pleading laws. Lewis v. Ctr. for Counsel-

ing and Health Res., No. C08-1086, 2009 WL 2342459, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
July 28, 2009) (saying "federal courts are not in agreement on this issue"), as
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